In Chapter II we investigate consumer behavior when facing target rebates, a rebate practice challenged by antitrust law. In three experiments, we confirm the hypothesis derived from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), that target rebates are likely to create psychological switching costs that can...

In Chapter II we investigate consumer behavior when facing target rebates, a rebate practice challenged by antitrust law. In three experiments, we confirm the hypothesis derived from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), that target rebates are likely to create psychological switching costs that can...

In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people’s expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different minimal group identities in participants and randomly assign participants to one of two treatments....

A bonus on the fine in response to the defendant running a corporate compliance program is superfluous because working leniency programs provide all the incentives necessary to implement efficient compliance. Others opposed to such a bonus argue that unreduced fines are sufficient to incentivize...

We investigate whether and how targeted rebates impede rational switching of consumers from an incumbent to an outside option (e.g., market entrant). In a real trading problem, participants repeatedly buy tokens and can enter a target rebate scheme. Buying in a rebate scheme considerably reduces...

In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill other people's expectations, plays out stronger if agents are socially close. I induce two different minimal group identities in participants and randomly assign participants to one of two treatments....