This paper examines the incentives from stock options for loss-averse employees subject to probability weighting …. Employing the certainty equivalence principle, I built on insights from Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to derive a continuous … finding of standard models based on the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) framework that options value to a risk …

incentives. Using various measures of performance, we find that European energy utilities link CEO compensation to firm …

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent … governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards …

We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which … through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had …

Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock …-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock …-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting empirical evidence points to the same conclusion. This paper provides an explanation …

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent … governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards. …

We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via …

deliberately provide managers with risk-taking incentives to address risk-related agency conflicts and these incentives do not … effects of managers' stock holdings by showing that these incentives vary based on firms' value-risk tradeoffs … managers' incentive compensation packages. I find that shareholder value increases with risk and therefore managerial risk …