While much is known about optimal design of auctions within the context of a single item for sale, little is known about optimal design of large platform markets like eBay and auto auction houses that house large numbers of concurrent auctions. We attempt a macro-level empirical market design...

We prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent-value, uniform-price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy. We show that the uniform-price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of...

We study signaling environments with two features that are common in practice: first, complete-information bliss points are heterogeneous across different types of senders; second, receivers observe many choices by each sender, rather than a single decision. We prove that, ironically, a...

I first provide a static model of associative memory, a mnemonic process wherein cues in the environment bias information recalled from memory. I apply the model in a principal-agent setting to analyze contradictory predictions for the relationship between employee morale and productivity from...

Substantial price variation for homogeneous goods in online markets is a well-known puzzle that has withstood attempts by empirical researchers to explain it. Economic theory suggests two possible sources of the dispersion: either market frictions are more important than previously thought, or...

Private-order market institutions founded on trust-based relational contracts suffer adverse selection and moral hazard problems, while public-order market institutions have a limited capacity to enforce contracts. I model agent selection between contract enforcement institutions and demonstrate...

We study a structural model of college admissions framed as a contest between a continuum of students for enrollment in a continuum of colleges where the contest outcome is decided by the students' choice of human capital (HC). Students have private information about their learning costs, and...

We provide a model of a decentralized, dynamic auction market platform (e.g., eBay) in which a large number of buyers and sellers participate in simultaneous, single-unit auctions each period. Our model accounts for the endogenous entry of agents and the impact of intertemporal optimization on...