The author argues that the decay of liberal capitalism is the consequence of social rules that leave unconstrained the unwarranted intrusion of government into our economic affairs and reward leaders who can succeed in this process of power politics

Why are some constitutions amended frequently and others hardly at all? An obvious candidate determinant is constitutional rigidity, i.e., the size and number of procedural barriers to amendment. Given some demand for amendment, greater rigidity implies a smaller supply. However, measures of...

Successful constitutionalism is characterized by de jure Constitutional provisions de facto binding political agents. A growing literature seeks to quantify cross-country variation in Constitutional compliance and explore its determinants (e.g., Law & Versteeg 2013; Gutmann et al. 2022; Voigt 2021). We...

This exploratory paper estimates the effects on well-being of two very important institutional symbols of 59 countries in 2007: national flags and constitutions. The results indicate that well-being responds positively to investment in material things as well as the existence of flags. However,...

This paper follows up on the work of de Vanssay et al. (2005) in examining characteristics of constitutions (e.g., parliamentary systems), using data originating from the Database of Political Institutions. With updated data, correlational findings are reproduced and extended. However,...

Ratings of institutional quality are widely known and used in academic literature. Among such ratings are some whose compilation procedure took decades to perfect. Dozens of assessments have been accumulated, pertaining to a large and growing list of countries. These ratings use expert...

The ratings of economic and political institutions are well-known and widely used in the Social Science literature. These ratings are heavily relied on Experts' evaluations with subjective ordinal ranking (i.g., from -10 to 10 points). Such evaluations can be occasionally driven by ideological...

In this paper we tested the hypothesis of the "political" basis for the "economic" rights. We constructed our own variables of political regimes' classification for years 1820-2000. We found significant positive interdependencies between the Democracy's indicators and Economic Growth. Protection...