Depression, double liability on bank shareholders was the predominant institutional framework aimed to constrain moral hazard. We …Scholars and regulators often maintain that extended shareholder liability reduces bank risk-taking. Prior to the Great … examine whether increased shareholder liability effectively moderated bank risk-taking. We find no evidence that double …

We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system …) costs from monitoring, aggregate lending to bank-dependent firms is inefficiently low. A monetary system with bank money … creation alleviates this problem, as banks can initiate lending by creating bank deposits without relying on household funding …

We study the effects of broadening the safety net on bank risk taking in Central Europe, using individual bank data and …

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is … value, and a risk measure, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at … despite the difficult financial environment, shareholders' risk-taking incentive was confined primarily to a small fraction of …

Using evidence from Russia, we explore the effect of the introduction of deposit insurance on bank risk. Drawing on …

Prior to the Great Depression, regulators imposed double liability on bank shareholders to ensure financial stability … and protect depositors. Under double liability, shareholders of failing banks lost their initial investment and had to pay … mitigating bank risks and providing a safety net for depositors before and during the Great Depression. We first develop a model …

The paper evaluates the impact of macroprudential capital regulation on bank capital, risk taking behaviour, and … solvency. The identification relies on the policy change in bank-level capital requirements across systemically important banks …