Information problems have a large role to play in insurance markets and the regulations governing these markets were in part designed to take such problems into account. Classification variables are usually the tools used to reduce adverse selection, whereas bonus-malus (or merit-rating) schemes...

This paper analyses multi-period regulation on procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator firms.

In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts and extended by many...

In this paper, we propose an empirical analysis of the presence of adverse selection in an insurance market. We first present a theroetical model of a market with adverse selection and we introduce different issues related to transaction costs, accident costs, risk aversion and moral hazard. We...

Le but de cette etude etait de developper un outil d'aide a la decision permettant aux enqueteurs des compagnies d'assurance d'etre mieux equipes pour combattre la fraude a l'assurance

We study the interaction between leverage, employment structure and compensation policies within firms.

In this paper we show how a shift in a return distribution affects the composition of an optimal portfolio in the case of one riskless asset and two risky assets. We obtain that, in general, such a shift modifies the composition of themutual fund. We also show that the separating conditions...

In this research, we introduce information structure as a variable to explain differences in salary profiles and rates of separation among firm.