Law and Finance theory stresses the importance of shareholder rights for the reliability and development of capital markets. Many European Parliaments picked up this corporate governance issue. We expand the analysis of Lele and Siems (2007) and show that the number of shareholder rights grew...

‘Shareholder rights' are the legal entitlements of shareholders via-a-vis companies in which they invest. A large body of research has sought to investigate how shareholder rights foster accountability of controllers. The concern has been that without accountability, managers and dominant...

In this paper, we design a multi-dimensional index to measure the quality of Corporate Governance systems adopted by firms and use it to investigate the correlation between Corporate Governance quality and firm value.Unlike most studies that examine the relationship between only one dimension of...

One of the measures foreseen in the Shareholder Rights Directive for enhancement of the rights of shareholders is the regulation of draft resolutions. The article addresses the central question of whether the extent of the implementation of the requirements regulating draft resolutions and their...

Pragmatic and effective research on corporate governance often turns critically on appreciating the legal institutions surrounding corporate entities—yet such nuances are often unfamiliar or poorly specified to economists and other social scientists without legal training. This chapter...

This book presents a new approach to the valuation of capital asset investments and investment decision-making. Starting from simple premises and working logically through three basic elements (capital, income, and cash flow), it guides readers on an interdisciplinary journey through the...

This paper investigates whether the identity of controlling shareholders influences the financing decision of the firm. In particular, we explore the impact of family control on firm debt levels. We also study the effect of family involvement in management on firm leverage. Using a sample of...

This study investigates how debt maturity structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. The empirical evidence reveals an inverse relation between the strength of shareholder rights and debt maturity. We contend that managers of firms with weak shareholder rights eschew choosing...

I analyze the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers between directors and shareholders. My contribution is to show who actually has power in a takeover and what factors are at work to give such power. Although directors are traditionally considered to be in charge in deciding...