, outlook, and ideology, have also empowered activist shareholders.There are strong normative arguments for disempowering … shareholders and, accordingly, for rolling back the gains shareholder activists have made. Whether that will prove possible in the …, while encouraging shareholder efforts to hold directors and managers accountable …

In theory, large institutional investors are in an excellent position to overcome collective action problems and form … voting coalitions to actively monitor and discipline managers of public corporations. This article argues that it is highly …, and those that get formed will be highly unstable; moreover, one would expect that rational corporate managers will use …

I analyze the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers between directors and shareholders. My …, shareholders nevertheless may have the power to reverse the outcome via a vote. I argue that even though shareholders sometimes … removability, shareholders’ inability to call special meetings or to act by written consent, supermajority rules, proxy and …

in an attempt to delay and frustrate the raider and to keep the offer away from the shareholders …

We examine the effect of shareholder litigation rights on managers' acquisition decisions. Our experimental design … is the result of managers' freedom to conduct empire-building acquisitions using overvalued equity. Overall, our findings …

shareholder litigation, managers prefer to live a quiet life, intentionally avoiding risky and contentious activities, which …