In a set of preregistered experiments with general population, participants receive recommended answers to an economics questionnaire by two computerized advisors. One advisor is of high-accuracy (the Expert) and recommends the answers produced by academic consensus. The other advisor is of low...

In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...

In a series of experiments with 375 participants, we investigate the impact of biased polls on election outcomes, when voters have the opportunity to observe and learn about the bias by playing multiple voting rounds. While in control conditions, polls are unbiased, in treatment conditions,...