The paper extends the factor and decomposition theorems for functions to the category Rel of sets and relations. The converse theorems are also stated and proved. We show that the (retraction, isomorphism, section)-decomposable relations form a closure system on Mor (Rel), and characterize it in...

This paper is concerned with the procedural aspects of collective choice and the impact of the parties' participation rights on the optimal mechanism. We find that the mechanism designer generally benefits from the selective engagement of the agents-the exclusion of some agent-types from the...

The paper extends the factor and decomposition theorems for functions to the category Rel of sets and relations. The converse theorems are also stated and proved. We show that the (retraction, isomorphism, section)-decomposable relations form a closure system on Mor (Rel), and characterize it in...

This paper is concerned with the procedural aspects of collective choice and the impact of the parties' participation rights on the optimal mechanism. We find that the mechanism designer generally benefits from the selective engagement of the agents-the exclusion of some agent-types from the...

This paper addresses the class of generalized agency problems: situations in which adverse selection and moral hazard are jointly present. We present a decomposition of the principal's optimization problem under the first-order approach that sheds light on the interactions between the two types...