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Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance

Masciandaro, Donato (ed.); Quintyn, Marc (contributor) - 2007

supervision architectures and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro -- Architectures of supervisory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003441477

Experienced members of the supervisory board : who is appointed and which bank appoints?

Nehring, Inge - In: External appointeesand successions on boards, (pp. 109-145). 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011915530

Central banks' supervisory guidance on corporate governance and bank stability : evidence from African countries

Mutarindwa, Samuel; Schäfer, Dorothea; Stephan, Andreas - In: Emerging markets review 43 (2020), pp. 1-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012414542

Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance

Masciandaro, Donato (ed.); Quintyn, Marc (ed.) - 2007

This book offers the first systematic discussion of a new and promising field: the economics of independence, accountability and governance of financial supervision institutions. For a long time the design of supervision had been an irrelevant issue, both in theory and practice. This perception...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015412483