When the assignment of incentives is uncertain, we study how the regularity and frequency of rewards and risk attitudes … influence participation and effort. We contrast three incentive schemes in a real-effort experiment in which individuals decide … show that less able and more risk averse players are less persistent in effort. Intermittent incentives lead to a greater …

Whereas economists have made extensive studies of the impact of levels of incentives on behavior, they have paid little … attention to the effects of regularity and frequency of incentives. We contrasted three ways of rewarding participants in a real …-effort experiment in which individuals had to decide when to exit the situation: a continuous reinforcement schedule (all periods paid …

We run a field experiment to investigate whether competing in rank-order tournaments with different prize spreads … affects individual performance. Our experiment involved students from an Italian University who took an intermediate exam in …

intent, that can cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment that provides the material circumstances necessary for …Empirical studies of the principal-agent relationship find that extrinsic incentives work in many instances, linking … drive to work to master a skill or to improve one's self image, is thought to be the key to whether incentives work or not …

reinforcement ; ambiguity ; randomness ; incentives ; experiment …Whereas economists have made extensive studies of the impact of levels of incentives on behavior, they have paid little … attention to the effects of regularity and frequency of incentives. We contrasted three ways of rewarding participants in a real …

This agent-based model contributes to a theory of corporate culture in which company performance and employees …’ behaviour result from the interaction between financial incentives, motivational factors and endogenous social norms. Employees … simulations show that financial incentives can (i) lead to inefficient levels of cooperation, and (ii) reinforce value …

prior performance. We test this hypothesis in a lab experiment with two stages of a real effort task. Participants first … work individually without monetary incentives and are then assigned to teams of two where compensation is based on team …% higher first stage effort than random matching. In line with the theory the latter result is more pronounced when the task …

is true, then the lessons to be learned from principal-agency theory are all the wrong ones. Concentrating on incentives …The canonical principal-agent problem involves a risk-neutral principal who must use incentives to motivate a risk … inefficient risk-sharing. These experimental outcomes, while anomalous from the standpoint of principal-agency theory, are quite …