Based on historical analogies, we emphasize a connection between financial crises and technological shifts where the shift calls for a structural economic transformation. We discuss how political pressures related to this structural transformation pave the way for the return of a new form of...

Motivated by agency theory and arguments from linguistic studies, we argue in this paper the internationalization of a firm's audit committee to be associated with weaker firm-level corporate governance. Based on 2,015 publicly traded European firms from 16 countries over 2000-2018, we find the...

This study examines the effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value (Tobin's Q). On a basis of firms with headquarters in Norway or Sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider Anglo-American...

This study outlines how the corporate governance of emerging market firms is influenced by corporate affiliation and institutional embeddedness. We argue that the stronger the business group affiliation, the less likely is the emerging market firm to adopt shareholder value-enhancing corporate...

This study examines the role of institutional environment in influencing the migration of corporate governance best practice into 22 emerging African economies. Using a unique and comprehensive sample hand-collected sample of 202 IPO firms from across the continent we adopt a novel institutional...

Prior literature shows that choices regarding board composition are associated with earnings management. We add to this literature by examining the effects of the presence of a foreign board member on earnings management. Using a sample of 3,249 firm-year observations representing 586...

Ceding ownership to outside investors provides a control dilemma for founders. In less developed capital markets with weaker formal institutions, we argue that retained founder director ownership can lower the transaction costs of external capital. Our argument rests on incomplete contracting...