contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists when the latter are located outside the region. Because … there is moral hazard, venture capitalists do not offer entrepreneurs the first best investment contract and entrepreneurial …

We use a two period model to analyze the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in an … (collateralizable income) on investment by entrepreneurs. Next, we analyze the interaction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists … second period entrepreneurs. We show that a rise in the per capita debt has an effect on investment that is analogous to a …

We use a two period model to analyze the contractual relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in an … (collateralizable income) on investment by entrepreneurs. Next, we analyze the interaction between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists … second period entrepreneurs. We show that a rise in the per capita debt has an effect on investment that is analogous to a …

We study entrepreneurs' start-up financing from banks and local financiers. An informal network, whose membership … cannot be observed by outsiders, conveys the good signals it gets about the hidden types of network entrepreneurs to local … absence of a network. Thus, the formation of the network is inefficient as entrepreneurs incur networking costs for purely …

adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We first show that …

two-sided asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, we prove that convertible bond can …

where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We show that as …

We study a regional economy with a large number of entrepreneurs who own firms and who want to go public. Specifically …