This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired … and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I … show that an optimal information policy comprises the full disclosure of acquired information, which eliminates the …

We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private … information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a … divergence. We characterize the policymaker's trade-offs via a novel object—the information relevance matrix—and label its …

flexibility and credibility. …

How much information should a central bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the … effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the Barro–Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy signals an … inflation-biased CB's private information on both these dimensions. We find that greater CB competence—more private information …

precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central … bank should disclose or not its information, but how the central bank should disclose it. We consider a static coordination … game in which the private sector receives n semi-public information plus their specific information, and we analyse the …

's private information. A novel feature is that the central bank ex ante determines how much information it acquires and how much … of this information it releases to the public. Using a static model with a neoclassical Phillips curve, I show that an … optimal information policy is composed of the full disclosure of the bank's acquired information, eliminating the signaling …

that the destabilizing effect of public information is less pronounced experimentally than when it does in theory. This is … information is fully released) is also available. Our experiment is based on subsequent framework of Morris and Shin (2002 … in this paper. Our experiment indicates that - when fully disclosed - players overreact to public information and this …

transparency from public institutions. Central bankers, based on empirical research, also believe that sharing information has … information is that market participants may be less inclined to invest in private information. Theoretical results suggest that …. Crowding out of information acquisition does indeed take place, but only where it is most pronounced does the predictive …