Two producers offer differentiated goods to a representative consumer. The buyer has distinct marginal valuations for the quality of the products. Each producer perfectly knows the consumer's taste for its own product, but remains uninformed about its taste for the rival's product. When each...

Two producers offer differentiated goods to a representative consumer. The buyer has distinct marginal valuations for the quality of the products. Each producer knows perfectly the consumer’s taste for its own product, but remains uninformed about its taste for the rival’s product. When each...

Producers of software viewers commonly offer basic versions of their products for freewhile more sophisticated versions are highly priced, thereby providing less attractive orlower valuations consumers with larger utility levels. We give some foundations to thisoutcome called versioning. We...

Nous considérons une firme qui génère un risque pour l'environnement via son activité industrielle et qui a une information privée à la fois sur son effort de précaution et sur le montant de ses actifs. Nous étudions l'interaction entre l'audit ex ante de l'effort de précaution par un...

Producers of software viewers commonly offer basic versions of their products for free while more sophisticated versions are highly priced, thereby, providing less attractive or lower valuations consumers with larger utility levels. We give some foundations to this outcome called versioning. We...

We consider a tax competition game between asymmetrically un-informed governments. Two governments simultaneously propose tax arrangements to attract a multinational firm (MNF) which has an ex-ante preference to operate in both countries, and governments anticipate that once the MNF accepts...