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Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation

Vorobyev, Dmitriy - 2020

during an election day. Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters have privately observed preferences …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221414

On the veil-of-ignorance principle : welfare-optimal information disclosure in voting

Van der Straeten, Karine; Yamashita, Takuro - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335088

Voting with public information

Liu, Shuo - 2017 - This version: June 2017

profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the commonly-used simultaneous voting rules, while the intuitive but … public information introduces general correlation between the signals observed by the agents. We propose simple voting … public information. The proposed voting procedures also have additional advantages when there is a concern for strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729095

Voting with public information

Liu, Shuo - In: Games and economic behavior 113 (2019), pp. 694-719

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174537

Information aggregation in large collective purchases

Arieli, Itai; Koren, Moran; Smorodinsky, Rann - In: Economic theory 78 (2024) 1, pp. 295-345

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015185088

Manipulated electorates and information aggregation

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - In: The review of economic studies : RES 87 (2020) 2, pp. 997-1033

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012197710

How transparency kills information aggregation : (and why that may be a good thing) ; conference paper

Fehrler, Sebastian; Hughes, Niall - 2014

than in theory. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486059

Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation

Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2018

We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a in state a and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929373

Voting on tricky questions

Tajika, Tomoya - In: Games and economic behavior 132 (2022), pp. 380-389

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337425

Information and Polarization

Liu, Zanhui - 2023

Informed voters are believed to be necessary for the well-functioning of elections. However, the puzzle is raised: Why are voters and politicians becoming more polarized despite the increased availability of information? We consider an election with policy-motivated candidates and partially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347676