Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

We prove existence and purification results for strategic environments possessing a product structure that includes classes of large games, stochastic games, and models of endogenous institutions. Applied to large games, the results yield existence of pure-strategy equilibria allowing for...

We prove existence and purification results for equilibria in which players choose extreme points of their feasible actions in a class of strategic environments exhibiting a product structure. We assume finite-dimensional action sets and allow for infinite-dimensional externalities. Applied to...

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...