We test recent theories of when companies go public which predict that 1) more companies will go public when outside valuations are high or have increased, 2) companies prefer going public when uncertainty about their future profitability is high, and 3) firms whose controlling shareholders...

We study the role of underwriter compensation in mitigating conflicts of interest betweencompanies going public and their investment bankers. Making the bank s compensation moresensitive to the issuer s valuation should reduce agency conflicts and thus underpricing. Consistent with this...

This paper analyzes the determinants of buyout funds' investment decisions. In a model in which the supply of capital is quot;stickyquot; in the short run, we link the timing of funds' investment decisions, their risk-taking behavior, and the returns they subsequently earn on their buyouts to...

Sell-side analysts face pressure to provide favorable opinions on their employers' investment banking clients and to boost brokerage business, yet institutional investors value unbiased research. Because of their dependence on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading...

We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer's investment-banking relationships with...

Using a unique dataset of private equity funds over the last two decades, this paper analyzes the cash flow, return, and risk characteristics of private equity. Unlike previous studies, we have detailed cash flow data for each fund, rather than aggregate or accounting returns. We also know the...

We study the role of underwriter compensation in mitigating conflicts of interest between companies going public and their investment bankers. Making the bank's compensation more sensitive to the issuer's valuation should reduce agency conflicts and thus underpricing (Baron (1982), Biais,...

Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately-held firms, such as joint ventures or venture capital-backed firms. We provide an explanation for the use of put and call options, tag-along rights, drag-along rights, demand rights, piggy-back rights, and catch-up...

We model an IPO company's optimal response to the presence of sentiment investors and short sale constraints. Given regulatory constraints on price discrimination, the optimal mechanism involves the issuer allocating stock to 'regular' institutional investors for subsequent resale to sentiment...

We test recent theories of when companies go public which predict that 1) more companies will go public when outside valuations are high or have increased, 2) companies prefer going public when uncertainty about their future profitability is high, and 3) firms whose controlling shareholders...