We investigate the empirical puzzle why banks pressured their analysts to provide aggressiveassessments of issuing firms during the 1990s when doing so apparently had little positive effect on their chances of receiving lead-management appointments and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and...

We examine the costs and benefits of the global integration of primary equity markets associated with the parallel diffusion of U.S. underwriting methods. We analyze both direct and indirect costs (associated with underpricing) using a unique dataset of 2,132 IPOs by non-U.S. issuers from 65...

We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Variation in parameters can produce either positive or negative...

We provide evidence on the value of patents to startups by leveraging the quasi-random assignment of applications to examiners with different propensities to grant patents. Using unique data on all first-time applications filed at the U.S. Patent Office since 2001, we find that startups that win...

Using staggered corporate income tax changes across U.S. states, we show that taxes have a first-order effect on capital structure. Firms increase leverage by around 40 basis points for every percentage-point tax increase. Consistent with dynamic tradeoff theory, the effect is asymmetric:...

Using staggered corporate income tax changes across U.S. states, we show that taxes have a first-order effect on capital structure. Firms increase leverage by around 40 basis points for every percentage-point tax increase. Consistent with dynamic tradeoff theory, the effect is asymmetric:...

Can managers influence the liquidity of their shares? We use plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of public information to show that firms seek to actively shape their information environments by voluntarily disclosing more information than is mandated by market regulations and that such...

We evaluate differences in investment behavior between stock market listed and privately held firms in the U.S. using a rich new data source on private firms. Listed firms invest less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities compared to observably similar, matched private...

We ask when and how a diverse board can benefit shareholders. Board diversity may be value-increasing even if some directors have agendas that are not perfectly aligned with shareholders' interests. Diversity commits the board to a high information standard because directors with opposing...

We structurally estimate a set of firm- and time-varying measures of the magnitude of external financial constraints. By considering the entire capital structure—equity and debt of various maturities—we identify on which external financing margin(s) a firm is constrained at a given point in...