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Limiting the leader : fairness concerns in team production with leader-determined monitoring
Boosey, Luke; Isaac, R. Mark; Ramalingam, Abhijit - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012664760
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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
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Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts
Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2005
performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027830
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Misaligned Managerial Incentives and Employee Wage Schedules
Zubrickas, Robertas - 2013
the owner's capacity to monitor delegated managers. We show how resultant misaligned managerial incentives can translate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014046269
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The degradation of distorted performance measures
Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - 2008
Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376645
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Career concerns, shareholder monitoring and investment efficiency : from the perspective of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEs
Wan, Hualin; Zhu, Kai; Chen, Xinyuan - In: China journal of accounting research : CJAR 8 (2015) 1, pp. 59-73
This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999-2007 period and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844386
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Incentivizing team leaders : a firm-level experiment on subjective performance evaluation of leadership skills
Gall, Thomas; Hu, Xiaocheng; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2023
In teamwork settings, providing effective leadership can be challenging for team leaders due to multitasking and the …, which can ultimately impede the productivity of the team. To address this problem, we conduct a field experiment at a … manufacturing firm, introducing a relative subjective performance evaluation of team leaders' leadership activities by their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278019
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Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach
Li, Chen - 2019
. The results favor the team perspective under which unilateral shirking is assumed infeasible for managers. The analysis … compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses …-based measures of agency costs. The risk premium can explain up to 37% of total compensation for higher-paid managers in large firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904639
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Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach
Li, Chen - 2019
. The results favor the team perspective under which unilateral shirking is assumed infeasible for managers. The analysis … compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses …-based measures of agency costs. The risk premium can explain up to 37% of total compensation for higher-paid managers in large firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899926