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Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kaplow, Louis - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000839464

Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kaplow, Louis - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000839467

Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals' likelihood of avoiding detection

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - In: International review of law and economics 13 (1993) 2, pp. 217-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001149751

Optimal sanctions when individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - In: The journal of legal studies 21 (1992) 2, pp. 365-370

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001141136

Concentration in the Israeli economy and bank investment in nonfinancial companies

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kaplow, Louis; Fried, Jesse M. - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000957318

Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension

Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Kaplow, Louis - 2021

This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension. When individuals are perfectly informed, optimal sanctions are maximal because, as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, society can economize on enforcement resources by reducing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245720