Department: Graduate School of Business.

We analyze a revenue management problem in which a seller facing a Poisson arrival stream of consumers operates an online multiunit auction. Consumers can get the product from an alternative list price channel. We consider two variants of this problem: In the first variant, the list price is an...

We analyze a revenue management problem in which a seller endowed with an initial inventory operates a selling with binding reservations scheme. Upon arrival, each consumer, trying to maximize his own utility, must decide either to buy at the full price and get the item immediately or to place a...

We analyze a dynamic auction, in which a seller with C units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated into T time periods. Each group of buyers has independent, private values for a single unit. Buyers compete directly against each other within a period, as in a traditional auction, and...

Discrete choice models are appealing for airline revenue management (RM) because they offer a means to profitably exploit preferences for attributes such as time of day, routing, brand, and price. They are also good at modeling demand for unrestricted fare class structures, which are widespread...

No abstract available.

We consider a revenue management, network capacity control problem in a setting where heterogeneous customers choose among the various products offered by a firm (e.g., different flight times, fare classes, and/or routings). Customers may therefore substitute if their preferred products are not...

We study a supply chain where an upstream supplier auctions his inventory or capacity as a bundle. The importance of this setting is twofold: From a practical point of view, there are several examples, both in manufacturing (e.g., auctioning the capacity of a wafer fabrication facility) and...