chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public …, and she builds a reputation by continuing when the stakes reach a new minimum. We discuss applications to corporate … reputation management, online vendor reputation, and limit pricing with stochastic demand …

chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public …, and she builds a reputation by continuing when the stakes reach a new minimum. We discuss applications to corporate … reputation management, online vendor reputation, and limit pricing with stochastic demand. …

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays … two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent's reputation, and an informational role because …

I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series … uncertainty about the monitoring structure introduces new challenges to reputation building because there may not be a direct … ability to establish a reputation for commitment. I show that, when the short-run players cannot statistically distinguish …

signaling that arises when beliefs are public. Applications to models of leadership, reputation, and trading are examined …

reputation are examined. …