We analyze a simple model of bilateral bargaining under asymmetric information where the seller of an object can not simply say "no" by default to a buyer who is supposed to make a take-it-or-leave-it oer. Rather, he must acquire this option before the actual bargaining process begins. This...

This paper complements the traditional theory of teams (Fama (1980), Holmstrom (1982a,b)) by introducing endogenous team formation by agents who are concerned with their reputations and are informed about the types of their potential teammates. Such a situation leads to a trade of between...

This paper complements the traditional theory of teams (Fama (1980), Holmstrom (1982a,b)) by introducing endogenous team formation by agents who are concerned with their reputations and are informed about the types of their potential teammates. Such a situation leads to a tradeoff between...