We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized...

Attempts to characterize stock return predictability have generated a plethora of papers documenting the ability of various variables to explain conditional expected returns. However, there is little consensus on what the important conditioning variables are, giving rise to a great deal of model...

This paper considers the impact of the takeover channel on firm valuation. We usethe idea that takeover activity responds to investor expectations of future rate of return and hence to state variable(s) related to the time variation in risk premia. Thus firms with higher exposure to takeovers,...

This paper applies the methodology of Bai and Ng (2002, 2004) for decomposing large panel data into systematic and idiosyncratic components to both returns and turnover. Combining the methodology with a generalized-least-squares-based principal components procedure, we demonstrate that this...

This paper reinvestigates the performance of risk-based multifactor models. In particular, we generalize the Bayesian methodology of Shanken (1987b) and Kandel, McCulloch and Stambaugh (1995) from mean-variance efficiency to the ICAPM notion of multifactor efficiency. This methodology uses...

The methodology of Bai and Ng (2002, 2003) for decomposing large panel data into systematic and idiosyncratic components is applied to both returns and turnover. Combining this with a GLS-based principal components approach, we demonstrate that their procedure works well for both returns and...

The methodology of Bai and Ng (2002, 2003) for decomposing large panel data into systematic and idiosyncratic components is applied to both returns and turnover. Combining this with a GLS-based principal components approach, we demonstrate that their procedure works well for both returns and...

This paper investigates the effect of shareholder control on bondholder wealth. While stronger shareholder control can benefit bondholders by disciplining managers, it also increases the likelihood of events that can hurt bondholders, e.g. hostile takeovers. We hypothesize that shareholder...