Detroit has failed and its infrastructure is crumbling. But Detroit is not an isolated case. It is a paradigmatic example of increasing urban decay across the Unites States. While commentators have warned that the declining state of the country's infrastructure threatens US prosperity, there is...

This internet appendix provides supplemental results as described in our paper "Blood in the Water: The Value of Antitakeover Provisions During Market Shocks", available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3716995

This Article makes two original contributions to the contract interpretation and renegotiation literatures. First, we introduce an under-explored cause of renegotiation failure: party uncertainty regarding the type of court that will interpret their contract. Parties may predict differently how...

Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line - using incentives...

Under the current model of corporate fiduciary law, informational asymmetry between managers and creditors makes the debt contract inadequate to efficiently govern the debtor-creditor relationship. More specifically, as currently devised, the debt contract fails to prevent managerial...

This Essay introduces general equilibrium theory (GET) and mechanism design theory (MD) in a general sense (rather than in piece meal applications) to the study of contract law. As a positive matter, this introduction reveals three understudied areas: (i) when the equilibrium contract is...

In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to comprehensive economic examination and finds it...

Two models of the firm dominate corporate law. Under the management-power model, decision-making power rests primarily with corporate insiders (officers and directors). The competing shareholder-power model defends increased shareholder power to limit managerial authority. Both models view...