How do incentives to collude depend on how asymmetric firms are? In many markets product quality is an important parameter that determines firms' market strategies. We study collusion in a quality-differentiated duopoly and we adopt a Nash bargaining approach to compute the collusive equilibrium...

How do incentives to collude depend on how asymmetric firms are? In digital and technology markets product quality is an important parameter that determines firms' market strategies. We study collusion in a quality differentiated duopoly and we adopt a Nash bargaining approach to compute the...

This paper analyses firms’ behaviour towards compatibility and the relation of these decisions with their incentives to invest into improving their durable, network goods. By using a sequential game where the dominant firm plays first, we give its competitor the ability to build on innovations...

This paper investigates the relation between firms’R&D incentives and their compatibility decisions regarding durable, imperfectly substitutable network goods in the presence of forward looking consumers. Non drastic product innovation is sequential and both an initially dominant firm and a...