I study a dynamic principal agent model in which the effort cost of the agent is unknown to the principal. The principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high...

I study the optimal choice of investment projects in a continuous time moral hazard model with multitasking. While in the first best, projects are invariably chosen by the net present value (NPV) criterion, moral hazard introduces a cutoff for project execution which depends on both a project's...

We prove that under standard Lipschitz and growth conditions, the value function of all optimal control problems for one-dimensional diffusions is twice differentiable, as long as the control space is compact and the volatility is uniformly bounded below, away from zero. Under similar...

I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous‐time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to a net present value (NPV) criterion can...

I study the optimal choice of investment projects in a continuous-time moral hazard model with multitasking. While in the first best, projects are invariably chosen by the net present value (NPV) criterion, moral hazard introduces a cutoff for project selection which depends on both a project's...

We prove that under standard Lipschitz and growth conditions, the value function of all optimal control problems for one-dimensional diffusions is twice continuously differentiable, as long as the control space is compact and the volatility is uniformly bounded below, away from zero. Under...

In dynamic models driven by diffusion processes, the smoothness of the value function plays a crucial role for characterizing properties of the solution. However, available methods to ensure such smoothness have limited applicability in economics, and economists have often relied on either...

I study a dynamic principal agent model in which the effort cost of the agent is unknown to the principal. The principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high...

I study the optimal choice of investment projects in a continuous time moral hazard model with multitasking. While in the first best, projects are invariably chosen by the net present value (NPV) criterion, moral hazard introduces a cutoff for project selection which depends on both a...