Similar Search Results

The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2004

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335223

The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games

Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent - 2009

The process of computing the nucleolus of arbitrary utility games is notoriously hard. A number of papers have appeared in which the nucleolus is computed by an algorithm in which either one or a huge number of huge linear programs have to be solved. We show that on the class of veto-rich games,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014087905

Intuitive Solutions in Game Representations : The Shapley Value Revisited

Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2018

We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost of the facilities. The intuitive solution in the representation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012925101

The Roll Call Interpretation of the Shapley Value

Kurz, Sascha - 2018

The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter's Shapley value can be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal, i.e., to bring about the required majority or to make this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913266

Values and Potential of Games with Cooperation Structure

Bilbao, Jesus-Mario - 1998

Games with cooperation structure are cooperative games with a family of feasible coalitions, that describe which coalitions can negotiate in the game. We study a model of cooperation structure and the corresponding restricted game, in which the feasible coalitions are those belonging to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215423

Note on an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value Without the Additivity Axiom

Nowak, Andrzej - 1998

We prove that the Banzhaf value is a unique symmetric solution having the dummy player property, the marginal contributions property introduced by Young (1985) and satisfying a very natural reduction axiom of Lehrer (1988)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220971

Valuing Inputs Under Supply Uncertainty : The Bayesian Shapley Value

Pongou, Roland - 2016

strategy Nash equilibrium. We present several applications of our theory to real-life situations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980207

The Multichoice Consistent Value

Calvo, Emilio; Gutiérrez, Esther; Santos, Juan Carlos - 2001

We consider multichoice NTU games, i.e., cooperative NTU games in which players can participate in the game with several levels of activity. For these games, we define and characterize axiomatically the multichoice consistent value, which is a generalization of the consistent NTU value for NTU...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014150974

Prosperity Properties of Tu-Games

van Gellekom, J. R. G.; Potters, Jos A. M.; Reijnierse, Hans - 1999

An important open problem in the theory of TU-games is to determine whether a game has a stable core (Von Neumann …-Morgenstern solution (1944)). This seems to be a rather difficult combinatorial problem. There are many sufficient conditions for core …-stability. Convexity is probably the best known of these properties. Other properties implying stability of the core are subconvexity and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192724

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games with Suspended Realizations of Threats

Cao, Zhigang - 2014

The Hart-and-Mas-Colell bargaining model [Hart and Mas-Colell (2010). “Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games.” Journal of the European Economics Association, 8, 7-33], which is based on strategic form games, is a very promising model possessing many beautiful features....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066306