This paper was prepared as a companion to the Mattioli Lectures delivered by Hal R. Varian, “Economics of Information Technology,†available at: http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/mattioli/mattioli.pdf. Professor Varian’s overview analyzes a variety of competitive...

We analyze patent licensing by a patent holder to downstream technology users. We study how the structure and level of royalties depends on the patent’s strength, i.e., the probability it would be upheld in court. We examine the social value of determining patent validity before...

Introduction: Market definition analysis, which is often central in merger cases, usually claims to follow the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (“Guidelinesâ€). The Guidelines describe a relevant product market...

We propose a simple, new test for making an initial determination of whether a proposed merger between rivals is likely to reduce competition and thus lead to higher prices. Under current antitrust policy, the government can establish a presumption that a proposed horizontal merger will harm...

The authors analyze incomplete long-term contracts when buyers incur relationship-specific set-up costs and sellers choose product or service quality that is not verifiable to third parties. If set-up costs are observable, the first-best outcome can be achieved even though contracts cannot...

We analyze an overlapping-generations model of duopolistic competition in the presence of consumer switching costs. Competition for established buyers is continually intermingled with competition for new, uncommitted buyers. In equilibrium the firm with attached customers typically specializes...

The authors analyze horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopoly. They find general conditions under which such mergers raise price, and show that any merger not creating synergies raises price. The authors develop a procedure for analyzing the effect of a merger on rivals and consumers and, thus,...