We propose a game theoretic model for multiplexity in signed networks through strategic interactions amongst n players who are linked to each other in an existing (fixed) signed network of friendships and enmities g, through which players experience peer pressure in their interactions with each...

Situations that require individuals to mutually cooperate are often analysed as coordination games. This paper proposes a model of cooperative network formation where the network is formed through the process of the coordination game being played between multiple agents. Additionally, network...

This paper explores possible theoretical underpinnings for homophily in signed social networks, particularly in the Indian context. The model of signed network formation proposed here considers a population which is divided into communities or identity groups that are hierarchically arranged in...

The paper, by providing example of an efficient liability assignment rule under which liabilities of interacting parties for accidental losses is not always coupled, demonstrates that decoupling is not inconsistent with efficient assignment of liabilities

This paper provides a partial characterization of efficient liability assignment rules. The main result of the paper implies that the assignment of liabilities under an efficient rule has to be coupled only when one party is negligent and the other is not and hence decoupling liability is not...

In this paper we consider a very general class of rules called simple liability assignment rules under which the assignment of liabilities can be coupled for some combinations of the levels of nonnegligence of the interacting parties and decoupled for other combinations, and explore the...

The paper, by providing example of an efficient liability assignment rule under which liabilities of interacting parties for accidental losses is not always coupled, demonstrates that decoupling is not entirely inconsistent with efficient assignment of liabilities