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of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance … experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same … differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327335
of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance … experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same … differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339883
selecting just one fair reputation equilibrium amongst the many possible. Elaborating on Binmore’s Natural Justice (2005) (but … justice within a game theoretical perspective, this task is accomplished from the ex ante (under the ‘veil of ignorance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185260
view of fairness than past experiments, considering both distributive justice (how much I get) and procedural justice (the … reason to do so, implying an innate concern with procedural justice. Second, divisions in these games are much more equitable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047994
distributive justice guarantee that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a finite economy where agents freely (and non … efficiency. We generalize our findings to economies with social justice and inclusion, implemented in the form of progressive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215769
Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) claim that a combination of efficiency seeking and minmax preferences dominates inequity aversion in simple dictator games. This result relies on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of their experiments were undergraduate students of economics and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343968
Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion. We show that these results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440438
distributive justice guarantee that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a finite economy where agents freely (and non … efficiency. We generalize our findings to economies with social justice and inclusion, implemented in the form of progressive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012659137
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736802
In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569033