The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividendof each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weightsfor all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividendsproportionally to their weights. In this...

The variable threat-bargaining model of Nash (1953) assumes that threats in the senseof binding commitments as to what one will do if bargaining ends in conflict, are chosenbefore bargaining. By comparison, late threats to be chosen after bargaining end in conflict,appear more natural and would...

Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly,they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique)bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize,bidding cost and...

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since thenseveral axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed tocost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

The paper examines the Porter and induced-innovation hypotheses in a firm model where: (i) the firmhas a vintage capital technology with two complementary factors, energy and capital ; (ii) scrappingis endogenous; (iii) technological progress is energy-saving and endogenous through purposive...

We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and...

Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning...

Russian natural gas is delivered to Western Europe by pipelines, running throughUkraine, Poland and other transit countries. We derive the bargaining power of thedifferent players along this supply chain endogenously from the architecture of thetransmission system and its possible extensions by...

The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a "partition function" outcome is broadly established and accepted, but...

We study cost-sharing rules in network problems where agents seek to ship quantities of some good to their respective locations, and the cost on each arc is linear in the flow crossing it. In this context, Core Selection requires that each subgroup of agents pay a joint cost share that is not...