The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers about $2 billion per year to retire cropland under ten- to fifteen-year contracts. Recent research by <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="R3">Wu (2000)</xref> found that slippage—an unintended stimulus of new plantings—offsets some of CRP's environmental benefits. In a comment on Wu, we...

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers about $2 billion per year to retire cropland under ten- to fifteen-year contracts. Recent research by <link rid="b3">Wu (2000)</link> found that slippage-an unintended stimulus of new plantings-offsets some of CRP's environmental benefits. In a comment on Wu, we...

This report estimates the impact that high levels of enrollment in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) have had on economic trends in rural counties since the program's inception in 1985 until today. The results of a growth model and quasi-experimental control group analysis indicate no...

The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) pays farmers about $2 billion per year to retire cropland under ten- to fifteen-year contracts. Recent research by Wu (2000) found that slippage - an unintended stimulus of new plantings - offsets some of CRP's environmental benefits. In a comment on Wu, we...

Standard economic intuition of revealed preference implies that when two parties freely enter into a contract then neither should be worse off. In this study, we develop a simple model showing that introducing the opportunity to contract can lower welfare for some, and perhaps all, contracting...

This study uses a large increase in US Federal crop insurance subsidies as a natural experiment to identify the importance of risk for farm operator labour supply. Subsidy increases induced greater crop insurance coverage, which in turn reduced farmers' financial risks. Crop insurance...