We study optimal tariff binding agreements among asymmetric countries that are subject to idiosyncratic political-economy shocks. We find that the optimal tariff binding of a sector is decreasing in the importing countries international market power in that sector. Moreover, under an optimal...

We study the optimal trade policy against a foreign oligopoly withendogenous quality. We show that, under the Most Favoured Nation(MFN) clause, a uniform tariff policy is always welfare improvingover the free trade equilibrium. However, a nonuniform tariff policyis always desirable on welfare...

This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...

Building on the results of the OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added TiVA database, the paper analyses the evolution of effective protection in about 50 developed and developing countries from 1995 to 2008. The paper reviews also the role of preferential agreements on effective protection as well as the...

The long-term declining role of manufacturing in the U.S. economy – reflecting a shift of the economy after World War II to a post-industrial orientation with an increased emphasis on services – was accelerated by the effects on manufacturing jobs and trade deficits of President Reagan's...

Mis-match of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial mis-invoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in LDCs. In...