In this paper we introduce a property of balanced contributions in the context of multi-issue allocation situations.Using this property, we characterise the run-to-the bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations

This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations. Characterisations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition and path independence

In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these playersÂ’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition....

In this paper we propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method. As an intermediate step, we provide some axiomatic...

In this paper, we consider the problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (Games Econ Behav 43:322–325, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2003</CitationRef>), of sharing the income from the sell of passes that allow the entrance in a set of museums. First, we recall some allocation rules and some properties presented in Ginsburgh and Zang...</citationref>

We define and study games with limited aspirations. In a game with limited aspirations there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions...

In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of matrix games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an...