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Sell First, Fix Later : Impact of Patching on Software Quality

Arora, Ashish; Caulkins, Jonathan P.; Telang, Rahul - 2014

We present a model of fixing or patching a software problem after the product has been released in the market …. Specifically, we model a software firm's trade-off in releasing a buggy product early and investments in fixing it later. Just as … the marginal cost of producing software can be effectively zero, so can be the marginal cost of repairing multiple copies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066722

Competitive Strategy of Proprietary Software Firms in an Open Source Environment

Baranes, Edmond - 2020

This paper analyzes the competitive strategy of proprietary software (PS) firm in the presence of open-source software … (OSS) where the copyright holder has granted software users access and use of OSS without any obligation regarding source … can provide OSS quality upgrades. We find that both types of software can coexist in equilibrium. Furthermore, despite the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857229

The Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis

Cole, Daniel H. - 2013

This paper, written as a contribution to a festchrift in honor of Neil Komesar, subjects his "comparative institutional analysis" (CIA) to a comparative analysis with various other social-scientific approaches to CIA. Neil Komesar is among the very few legal scholars who has taken to heart...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164692

Why Does General Deterrence Exist? A Study of Drinking Water Quality Regulation

Zhao, Dan; Lyon, Thomas P. - 2022

This paper studies the general deterrence effect associated with regulatory enforcement actions, using data on the quality violations and regulatory enforcement records of all 141,290 active drinking water systems in the U.S. between 1980 and 2017. We find that general deterrence among drinking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084340

Can CSR-Based Self-Regulation Be a Substitute for Legal Regulation? Conclusions from Public Goods Experiments

Maurer, Rainer - 2017

theory voluntary self-regulation is not possible, if it reduces company profits. (2) New experimental evidence, on which this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954945

The Return of the Public Domain after the Triumph of Markets : Revisiting the Most Basic of Fundamentals

Drache, Daniel - 2013

This prospective paper is about ‘after the triumph’, a short-hand for a much larger and more powerful idea, namely, the return, reconstitution and redeployment of the public domain in a post-Seattle and post-Washington consensus world order (Williamson 1990, 1999). The emergence of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151252

Warming Up to Water Markets

Adler, Jonathan H. - 2014

Water policy experts contend that the United States is heading toward a water scarcity crisis in the coming years. Global climate change is likely to make water scarcity much worse in the long run. This article argues that demands of current and projected water management challenges can best be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210537

Toward a Positive Theory of Disclosure Regulation : In Search of Institutional Foundations

Bertomeu, Jeremy; Cheynel, Edwige - 2013

This article develops a theory of standard-setting in which accounting standards emerge endogenously from an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014040115

Is This Salad Safe? Voluntary versus Mandatory Disclosure of Product Risk Characteristics

Aslam, Maria Vyshnya - 2015

This paper focuses on risk information campaigns familiarizing consumers with hazardous product attributes and compares policies advocating voluntary and mandatory displays of warning messages. The food allergen labeling campaign provides an opportunity to focus on the availability and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142386

Consumer-Optimal Disclosure With Costly Information Acquisition

Ichihashi, Shota - 2018

I study the question of how much product information should be available to consumers. A monopolist sells one unit of product. The consumer is initially uninformed of the product value but can incur costs to observe a noisy signal of his valuation. I show that consumer surplus can be increasing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910800