The common-support assumption of future type distributions is standard in the dynamic mechanism design literature (e.g., Baron and Besanko, 1984, Courty and Li, 2000, Eső and Szentes, 2007, Krähmer and Strausz, 2011, and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka, 2014). It is widely perceived that the...

The paper extends the optimal delegation framework pioneered by Holmström (1977, 1984) to a dynamic environment where, at the outset, the agent privately knows his ability to interpret decision relevant private information received later on. We show that any mechanism can be implemented by a...

The marginal cost of effort often increases as effort is exerted. In a dynamic moral hazard setting, dynamically increasing costs create information asymmetry. This paper characterizes the optimal contract and helps explain the popular yet thus far puzzling use of non-linear incentives, for...

We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by EU regulation of "distance sales contracts". With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is static and,...