We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from Quadratic Voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Citizens make public goods...

The original motivations of antitrust suggest an alternative remedy for market power: changes to corporate governance to include stakeholders who are subject to this power. In contrast to structural and behavioral remedies, “stakeholder remedies,” as we call them, have several desirable...

I draw on contemporary debates in political philosophy to understand the limits and hazards of using mechanism design to offer technical solutions to problems in which technical and social issues are intertwined. Using Boston's experience with K-12 school choice reform over the last half century...

Eric Posner and Glen Weyl's Radical Markets is dedicated to Vickrey and opens with a preface titled “The Auction Will Set You Free.” Vickrey's ideas offer a middle ground, according to Posner and Weyl, between the Right's view that markets must be “strengthened, expanded and purified”...

Introduction / Edward L. Glaeser, Tano Santos, and E. Glen Weyl -- Stochastic compounding and uncertain valuation / Lars Peter Hansen and José A. Scheinkman -- The good banker / Patrick Bolton -- How to implement contingent capital / Albert S. Kyle -- Bankruptcy laws and collateral regulation:...

The past three decades have been characterized by vast change and crises in global financial markets—and not in politically unstable countries but in the heart of the developed world, from the Great Recession in the United States to the banking crises in Japan and the Eurozone. As we try to...