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In the Email Game (Rubinstein, AER 89) noisy information channels may prevent efficient coordination, even when the … purely mixed Nash equilibrium strategy of one of the two coordination games to be played. This is because, conditional to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141087
Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014088719
is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the … desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make … coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein's result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059114
In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657893
The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014125061
We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game’s payoff structure. In … types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. And even though the precisions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139399
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001547600
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001547668
behavior with a coordination game. Accordingly, we construct a simultaneous incomplete information game model of charitable … giving based on a simple global coordination game. We demonstrate that merely by the effect of seed money to shift the … ; seed money ; global game ; coordination game ; excludable threshold public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921744