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"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts

Ewerhart, Christian; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 43 (2000) 1, pp. 115-125

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001512262

Ex post liability for harm vs. ex ante safety regulation : substitutes or complements? Comment

Ewerhart, Christian; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: The American economic review 88 (1998) 4

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001251091

Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge

Ewerhart, Christian - In: Homo oeconomicus 13 (1996) 4, pp. 501-514

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001214887

Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge

Ewerhart, Christian - In: Review of economics 48 (1997) 1, pp. 57-69

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001221707

Der Lock-in-Effekt und das Hold-up-Problem

Ewerhart, Christian - In: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium : WiSt ; … 26 (1997) 7, pp. 361-363

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001222153

'Yes Men,' Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts

Ewerhart, Christian; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2007

In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of 'yes man' behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222502