This paper examines three independent explanatory variables and their relation with cost overrun in order to decide whether this is different for Dutch infrastructure projects compared to worldwide findings. The three independent variables are project type (road, rail, and fixed link projects),...

Paradoxically, big is not scaleable. But modular is. Energy mega-projects are pursued in order to deliver a big step-up in capacity ahead of demand. Moreover, big is thought to generate economies of scale. However, Instead of making good on these promises, big investments typically fail —...

This paper gives an overview of good and bad practice for understanding and curbing cost overrun in large capital investment projects, with a critique of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018) as point of departure. Good practice entails: (a) Consistent definition and measurement of overrun; in contrast...

The suggestion to make a Chinese translation of Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition was particularly welcome. The book is about how to plan and deliver megaprojects in ways that secure successful outcomes. Megaprojects are highly risky and often go wrong, even in China. Some have gone...

The paper argues that if you want to get cost estimates right for large capital investment projects, you need to unlearn conventional cost forecasting, with its century-long record of getting cost estimates wrong. Instead you need to learn behavioral science, because behavior, and not artifacts,...

Road networks, on which governments around the world spend significant shares of their civil engineering budgets, are rightly considered the lifeline for modern and successful economies. While those have been transformed by numerous innovations and (especially digital) disruptions, both the...

How should government and business solve big problems? In bold leaps or in many smaller moves? We show that bespoke, one-off projects are prone to poorer outcomes than projects built on a repeatable platform. Repeatable projects are cheaper, faster, and scale at lower risk of failure. We compare...

The Iron Triangle formulates the holy trinity of objectives of project management – cost, schedule, and benefits. As our previous research has shown, ICT projects deviate from their initial cost estimate by more than 10% in 8 out of 10 cases. Academic research has argued that Optimism Bias and...

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequences...