In the experiments, subjects were split in two groups of 6 individuals, named yellow and blue. Each subject had to decide whether or not to buy a token. The price of a token (i.e., the cost of participation) was common knowledge and equal for everyone. The number of tokens bought in each group...

The step-level public good game differs strategically from the linear public good game. In the one-shot linear public good game the dominant strategy is not to contribute. In the one-shot step-level public good game multiple Nash equilibria exist. An inefficient Nash equilibrium involves nobody...

This paper assesses empirically the effect of oil price shocks on Portuguese aggregate economic activity, industrial production and price level. We take the usual multivariate VAR methodology to investigate the magnitude and stability of this relationship. In doing so, we follow the approach...

This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is...

This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments - the exclusion of colluding bidders - on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments and their most common alternative, fines, reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The...

This paper assesses empirically the effect of oil price shocks on Portuguese aggregate economic activity, industrial production and price level. We take the usual multivariate VAR methodology to investigate the magnitude and stability of this relationship. In doing so, we follow the approach...