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Is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium a Subset of Nash Equilibrium?

Teng, Jimmy - 2013

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires players to have beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players. However, the default...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158965

Analyzing Noisy Observation Game with Bayesian Iterative Conjectures Approach

Teng, Jimmy - 2012

This paper uses Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures approach to solve a noisy sequential game, that is, a sequential game with inaccurate observation clouded by noise. Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures requires players to form conjectures about the strategies of the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014163813

A Bayesian Theory of Games : An Analysis of Strategic Interactions with Statistical Decision Theoretic Foundation

Teng, Jimmy - 2012

This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium, Bayesian equilibrium by iterative conjectures (BEIC). It requires agents to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical decision theoretic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014172228

Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games : An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem

Horner, Johannes; Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru; … - 2013

We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045865

Chapter 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games

Von Stengel, Bernhard - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1723-1759). 2002

given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm finds one equilibrium of a bimatrix game … that show the subdivision of the players' mixed strategy sets into best-response regions. The Lemke-Howson algorithm is … of the algorithm based on lexicographic perturbations. Commonly used definitions of degenerate games are shown as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024500

Learning to coordinate : co-evolution and correlated equilibrium

Lee-Penagos, Alejandro - 2016

In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836

Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games : An Algorithm for δ → 1 and a Folk Theorem

Horner, Johannes - 2013

We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013094032

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2015

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029918

Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Horner, Johannes - 2013

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071462

On the notion of perfect bayesian equilibrium

González-Díaz, Julio; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2011

Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possibleʺ. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possibleʺ means. Then, we provide a simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782063