In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under …

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank …

We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an …

based on grades received at school. It is examined how this matching is affected if good grades are granted to some low …

when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann … set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets … show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences …

Studying the interactions between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is …

Random matching models with a continuum population are widely used in economics to study environments where agents … assignment of types to agents. The result applies to infinitely many types of agents, thus covering random matching models which … uniqueness of random matching …