expected. -- Oligopoly ; Collusion ; experiment ; Uncertainty ; negative externalities ; prisoner's dilemma … cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit … is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market …

cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit … is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … dampens cooperation, though only slightly. Surprisingly, externalities are immaterial. If we control for beliefs, they even …

cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit … is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … dampens cooperation, though only slightly. Surprisingly, externalities are immaterial. If we control for beliefs, they even …

agreements - lead to higher prices in a Bertrand oligopoly could be because of a selection effect: decision-makers who are … hypothesis we run an experiment where participants play two consecutive Bertrand pricing games: first a standard version without …

We study to what extent collusive behavior is affected by the awareness of negative externalities. Theories of outcome …-based social preferences suggest that negative externalities make collusion harder to sustain than predicted by standard economic … strengthened if there exist outsiders that gain from cooperative break down. We investigate this in a laboratory experiment …

Oligopoly has been among the first topics in the experimental economics. Over half a century, some 150 papers have been …

Multiple Cournot oligopoly experiments found more collusive behavior in markets with fewer firms (Huck et al., 2004 …

Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain … might be willing to run a limited risk of being exploited by their competitors, hoping that the investment pays. This paper … oligopoly as a linear public good …

oligopoly as a linear public good. -- Cartel ; Oligopoly ; Bertrand ; Cournot ; Public Good ; Externality ; Experiment …Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain … might be willing to run a limited risk of being exploited by their competitors, hoping that the investment pays. This paper …