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Incentive contracts for politicians and the information efficiency of a democracy

Liessem, Verena - 2003

A campaign model in which candidates can make law announcements for reforms in the next term will be considered. Acquiring information about these laws incurs the candidates a certain cost. The conditions under which a candidate acquires information about a given law during the campaign will be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075256

Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans - 2021

When politicians are short-term oriented or future elections do not sufficiently reflect the success of past policies …, democratic elections cannot motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer … if the public is unsure about the politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321142

Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

Gersbach, Hans - 2001

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians … to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become … politicians time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764

A theory of threshold contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706

Incentive pay for policy-makers?

Britz, Volker; Ebrahimi, Afsoon; Gersbach, Hans - 2018 - This version: December 2018

We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962135

Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game

Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1151-1189

We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937306

Informationally Simple Incentives

Gleyze, Simon - 2020

We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others'. The choice of the mechanism generates informational incentives as it affects what information is acquired before play begins. A mechanism is informationally simple if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844328