rule can be used to generate a core allocation and can be viewed as the average of two specific marginal vectors …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …

We introduce a theory on marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with arbitrary coalition … structure. The theory is based on the notion of nested sets and the complex of nested sets associated to an arbitrary set system … graph and the NT-solution coincides with the average tree solution. We also study core stability of the solutions and show …

is the same. We further give weak forms of convexity that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the core stability …

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …