When the private incentives faced by individuals in a society are not properly aligned with their shared goals, a collective action problem arises. This paper focuses on the free-rider problem of aid, the collective action problem of getting people to contribute privately to charity. It examines...

We experimentally investigate the path dependence of voluntary contributions in a public good game with heterogeneous agents who vary in their ability to increase the public good. More specifically, we analyze whether contribution norms observed in a first phase of the experiment under a...

Using a diagram called a "Kolm triangle" adopted in Kolm (197'7, the important issues of 1) Pareto efficiency and the core, and 2) Lindahl equilibrium and the core in the resource allocation problem involving public goods analyzed by Foley (197'7 and Nikaido (1976) can be illustrated merely...

Most of the literature on government intervention in models where public goods are provided through voluntary contributions focuses on interventions that change the total level of a public good, which is known to be (almost always) underprovided relative to the "efficient" level. However,...

We prove existence and generic regularity of equilibria in a general equilibrium model of a completely decentralized pure public good economy. Competitive firms using private goods as inputs produce the public good, which is privately provided by households. Previous studies on private provision...

We analyze a general equilibrium model of a completely decentralized pure public good economy. Competitive firms using private goods as inputs produce the public good, which is privately provided by households. Previous studies on private provision of public goods typically use one private good,...